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EMPIRICAL STUDY
DELIBERATING ABOUT DOLLARS: THE SEVERITY SHIFT
David Schkade, *
Cass R- Sunstein,**
and Daniel Kahneman***
How does juy deliberation affect the predeliberation judgments of indi-
vidualjurors? In this paper we make progress on that question by reporting
the results of a study of over 500 mock juries composed of over 3000 juy
eligible citizens. Our principalfinding is that with respect to dollars, deliber-
ation produces a "severity shift," in which the jury's dollar verdict is system-
atically higher than that of the median of its jurors' predeliberation judg-
ments. A "deliberation shift analysis" is introduced to measure the effect of
deliberation. The severity shift is attributed to a "rhetorical asymmetry," in
which arguments for higher awards are more persuasive than arguments for
lower awards. When judgments are measured not in terms of dollars but on
a rating scale of punishment severity, deliberation increased high ratings
and decreased low ratings. We also find that deliberation does not alleviate
the problem of erratic and unpredictable individual dollar awards, but in
fact exacerbates it. Implications for punitive damage awards and delibera-
tion generally are discussed.
INTRODUCTION
How, if at all, is the outcome of group deliberation different from a
statistical aggregation of individual predeliberation judgments? How
might jury deliberations depart from the median or mean of individual
judgments? Speculation is not difficult. Perhaps juries converge toward
the midpoint of individual judgments; perhaps juries move away from, or
toward, the high or low of individual extremes. Perhaps juries produce
an outcome that is more just or more accurate; perhaps juries generate
more predictable and less erratic judgments, so that unpredictability at
the individual level, or at the level of the mean or median of (six or
twelve) individual judgments, is further reduced by deliberation at the
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jury level. A pervasive question is whether a deliberating jury has the ef-
fect of producing outcomes that treat the similarly situated similarly-
perhaps in terms of civil or criminal liability (do people who have en-
gaged in the same conduct receive the same verdict?), perhaps in the
determination of appropriate damage awards, either compensatory or pu-
nitive (do similarly situated people receive the same awards?).'
In this Empirical Study, we attempt to make some progress on these
questions. We do so principally by reporting the results of an extensive
study of mock juries (over 3000 people and 500 juries in total). Six-per-
son juries were asked to deliberate about the appropriate punishment in
civil cases involving personal injury in two ways, by setting punitive awards
in dollars and by indicating, on a rating scale, the severity of the punish-
ment they wished to inflict on the defendant. Our most important and
general finding is that with respect to dollar awards, deliberation pro-
duces a severity shift: Thejury's dollar verdict is typically higher, and often
far higher, than the median judgment of the same jury's individual mem-
bers before deliberation began. 2
To compress a long story, our specific findings are these:
" Jurors followed a simple principle of majority rule in decid-
ing whether to impose punitive damages at all; the decision
to award damages was largely a function of the majority of
individual predeliberation votes.
" Where the median of individual predeliberation judgments
favored a high punishment rating, deliberation typically in-
creased the rating of the group.
" Where the median of individual predeliberation judgments
favored a low punishment rating, deliberation typically de-
creased the rating of the group.
* Where the median of individual predeliberation judgments
favored large dollar awards, deliberation typically increased
the dollar award of the group, often dramatically so: Among
juries that voted to award punitive damages, 27% reached dollar
verdicts that were as high as or higher than the highest predelibera-
tion judgment of their individual members.
" Where the median of individual predeliberation judgments
favored small dollar awards, deliberation typically increased
1. For concerns along this line, see BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S.
559, 587 (1996) (Breyer, J., concurring) ("Requiring the application of law, rather than a
decisionmaker's caprice, does more than simply provide citizens notice of what actions
may subject them to punishment; it also helps to assure the uniform general treatment of
similarly situated persons that is the essence of law itself.").
2. Compare the finding of a "leniency shift" in criminal juries and that this shift
produces more accurate judgments, because juries are more likely than individual jurors to
apply the reasonable doubt standard correctly. See RobertJ. MacCoun & Norbert L. Kerr,
Asymmetric Influence in Mock Jury Deliberation: Jurors' Bias for Leniency, 54 J.
Personality & Soc. Psychol. 21, 21-22 (1988) (reviewing literature and empirical findings
regarding hypothesis that deliberation makes jurors more lenient).
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the dollar award of the group, though the increase was
smaller than for high dollar awards.
With respect to punishment ratings, juries were neither more
nor less consistent and predictable than the mean or median
juror. With respect to dollar awards, juries were less consis-
tent and predictable than the mean or median juror. With
respect to dollar awards, jury deliberation substantially increased
unpredictability.
For punishment ratings, the principal effect of deliberation was thus
to move group judgments toward a more extreme version of the original
tendency (low or high) of individuals within that group. This effect is, we
believe, closely related to phenomena frequently studied under the labels
of "risky shifts," "choice shifts," and "group polarization." 3 For dollar
awards-the more important issue-the effect of deliberation was to pro-
duce a severity shift, such that juries' dollar verdicts were systematically
higher than the median predeliberation judgments of jurors. The sever-
ity shift stems, we believe, from a systematic rhetorical advantage held by
those arguing for higher dollar awards, an advantage that operates inde-
pendently of the particular case at issue.
The study reported here has the advantage of being extremely close
to-in fact part of the design is based on-an earlier one involving not
deliberating juries but responses of 899 individuals to punitive damage
cases.4 Our earlier study focused on the question of predictability, which
we understood to be a function of whether the judgment of one ran-
domly selected jury is a good predictor of the judgment of other ran-
domly selected juries judging the same case.5 We found a remarkable
consensus in the judgments of individual jurors, made on a rating scale,
about a series of personal injury cases. That study therefore found that
with respect to the underlying moral evaluation, groups of different (non-deliberat-
3. See, e.g., Daniel J. Isenberg, Group Polarization: A Critical Review and Meta-
Analysis, 50 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 1141 (1986); Craig McGarty et al., Group
Polarization as Conformity to the Prototypical Group Member, 31 Brit. J. Soc. Psychol. 1, 3
(1992); David G. Myers & Helmut Lamm, The Group Polarization Phenomenon, 83
Psychol. Bull. 602 (1976); Russell Spears et al., De-Individuation and Group Polarization in
Computer-Mediated Communication, 29 Brit. J. Soc. Psychol. 121 (1990). More
particularly, our data show a choice shift. See Johannes A. Zuber et al., Choice Shift and
Group Polarization: An Analysis of the Status of Arguments and Social Decision Schemes,
62J. Personality and Soc. Psychol. 50, 50 (1992) (defining "choice shift" as "the difference
between the arithmetic mean of the individual first preferences before discussion... and
the group decision").
4. See Cass R. Sunstein, Daniel Kahneman, & David Schkade, Assessing Punitive
Damages (with Notes on Cognition and Valuation in Law), 107 Yale L.J. 2071 (1998). This
presentation is geared to analysis of the legal issues; the underlying data, and relevant
psychological points, are presented in more detail in Daniel Kahneman, David Schkade, &
Cass R. Sunstein, Shared Outrage and Erratic Awards: The Psychology of Punitive
Damages, 16J. Risk & Uncertainty 49 (1998).
5. Thus variance among juries exposed to the same case is our basic measure of
unpredictability. We use the term "erratic" as a synonym for unpredictable.
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ing) jurors6 are likely to reach similar conclusions about the relative severity of
different cases.7 Thus all-white, all-poor, all-rich, all-educated, all-poorly-
educated, all-male, all-female, all-young, and all-old juries would probably
come to very similar rankings of a set of cases, at least in personal injury
cases and very possibly elsewhere.8 It follows that the median of the indi-
vidual judgments of any random group of twelve people is likely to pro-
duce a moral judgment that predicts, with a reasonably high degree of
accuracy, the judgment of any other group of twelve people (also defined
by the median of the individual judgments of group members).
At the same time, the study found that assessment of cases in terms of
dollars produces great unpredictability.9 To be sure, ranking the cases by
their aggregate dollar awards or by their aggregate punishment ratings
produced very similar orderings of the cases from least to most severe.
But dollar awards are unpredictable in the specific sense that punishment
ratings are not: The judgment of any particular group of twelve (deter-
mined by taking the median judgment as that of the group) is a poor
predictor of the judgment of other groups of twelve (determined in the
same way). 10 We showed that the same case, presented to different ju-
rors, will elicit similar ratings but quite different dollar awards, producing
a situation where the similarly situated are not treated similarly. This un-
predictability may well produce overdeterrence in risk-averse defendants
or in any case muffled and confusing signals.' We concluded that the
unbounded dollar scale contributes to evidently erratic monetary judg-
ments in many areas of the law, including not only punitive damages but
also compensatory awards in cases involving libel, sexual harassment, 12
6. As explained below, see infra text accompanying notes 15-16, we looked at
"statistical juries" consisting of random groups of 12 individual judgments, with the mean
or median judgment of each group of 12 reflecting the "verdict." See Sunstein,
Kahneman, & Schkade, supra note 4, at 2100-01.
7. See id. at 2095-100.
8. See id. at 2097-100.
9. See id. at 2100-04.
10. Note that we hold constant several factors that can be used to capture some of the
variability in punitive damage awards, such as compensatory damages, case category, case
particulars, and jurisdiction. It has been proposed by some authors that when analyzed
using these factors, punitive awards are reasonably predictable. See Theodore Eisenberg
et al., The Predictability of Punitive Damages, 26J. Legal Stud. 623, 644 (1997). Because
we hold these factors constant, they cannot account for the unpredictability that we
documented previously and that we document here.
11. See Paul H. Rubin et al., BMW v. Gore: Mitigating the Punitive Economics of
Punitive Damages, 5 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 179, 184 (1997).
12. See Judy Shih & Cass R. Sunstein, Damages in Sexual Harassment Cases 1-3, in
Sexual Harassment (Catharine MacKinnon & Reva Siegel eds., forthcoming 2000)
(manuscript on file with the Columbia Law Review) (finding that compensatory and
punitive damage awards are random in sexual harassment cases).
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pain and suffering, 13 and intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress. 14
Our earlier study did not involve deliberating juries. In the absence
of evidence about how deliberation would affect individual judgments, we
analyzed statistical juries, by treating the median of a deliberating group
as a good predictor of the ultimate judgment of the deliberating jury.15
We did so on the ground that the received wisdom seemed to support
this approach. 16 In this Empirical Study, we investigate the received wis-
dom-and find overwhelming evidence that it is wrong. The dollar
awards of deliberating groups were not close to any measure of central
tendency; they were much higher. We also explore several questions of
importance to those interested in damages, juries, and deliberative
processes in general.1 7 The answers have implications not only for puni-
tive awards, but also for other damage judgments (certainly when these
are hard to monetize), possibly for questions of civil and criminal liability
as well, and even for deliberation generally.
As we have noted, the present study finds that as compared with the
median of individual predeliberation judgments, deliberation signifi-
cantly increases high dollar awards, increases high punishment ratings,
decreases low punishment ratings, and modestly increases low dollar
awards. To summarize a complex analysis, it follows that deliberating juries
produce even more unpredictability than was observed for statisticaijuries. More-
over, dollar responses vary much more across juries than does punitive
intent on a rating scale. Thus we find shared moral judgments but erratic
dollar awards not only for individuals but for deliberative juries as well.
What follows at the normative level? Without an independent theory
of what awards should be, the evidence found here does not show
whether deliberation, and the resulting severity shift, make dollar awards
better or worse. The safest and most cautious conclusion is that to the
extent that unpredictable punitive damage awards raise a serious con-
cern, the problem is not removed by deliberation. To the extent that
unpredictability is a problem, our findings about the outcomes of jury
deliberation-predictable moral judgments but unpredictable dollar
awards-raise further questions about whether punitive awards should be
made by juries, or instead by judges or some kind of administrative insti-
13. See David W. Leebron, Final Moments: Damages for Pain and Suffering Prior to
Death, 64 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 256, 259 (1989) (arguing that tort awards for pain and suffering
"vary significantly and that neither the specific facts of the case nor differing theoretical
views on the functions of the awards can explain such variation").
14. See Sunstein, Kahneman, & Schkade, supra note 4, at 2131-40.
15. See id. at 2101.
16. See id.
17. On the latter topic, see Amy Gutmann & Dennis Thompson, Democracy and
Disagreement 199-230 (1996) (exploring how a deliberative perspective can provide
guidance in dealing with moral disagreement in politics); our analysis of group
polarization raises some questions for the deliberative conception of democracy, though
we leave those questions largely implicit here.
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tution.1 8 Perhaps juries should be asked to come up with punishment
ratings, not with dollar awards, and the legal system should "translate"
jury ratings into dollar awards by some preset formula. Our findings also
raise a set of novel issues about deliberation as a whole. Is deliberation
anything to celebrate if groups tend to move further in the direction sug-
gested by their original tendency-if (for example) high dollar awards go
up, low punishment ratings go down, and groups opposed to gun control
and in favor of affirmative action end up thinking a more extreme ver-
sion of what individual group members originally thought? We offer a
brief discussion of some of these issues, with particular reference to the
effects of deliberation on punishment ratings and on dollar awards.
I. THEORETICAL PRELIMINARIES: OUTRAGE AND SCALES
Jury awards of punitive damages have become one of the most con-
troversial topics in modem public law. 19 To take just one example, an
award of $4.9 billion against General Motors attracted a great deal of na-
tional attention in July of 1999.20 It is now clear that the Due Process
Clause imposes constraints on permissible awards. 21 A number of stat-
utes, enacted and proposed, create punitive damage "caps,"22 and high
awards have become a primary impetus for tort reform in general. 23
There are also controversial issues about punitive damage awards in civil
18. See, e.g., W. Kip Viscusi, Corporate Risk Analysis: A Reckless Act?, 52 Stan. L. Rev.
547, 549-52 (2000) (challenging jury verdicts on ground that they are often irrational).
The point is generally discussed in Sunstein, Kahneman, & Schkade, supra note 4, at
2126-30.
19. See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economic Structure of
Tort Law 160-65, 184-85, 223-24 (1987) (developing economic model of damages); Marc
Galanter & David Luban, PoeticJustice: Punitive Damages and Legal Pluralism, 42 Am. U.
L. Rev. 1393, 1394-96 (1993) (defending punitive damages as a morally necessary part of a
private law system); David G. Owen, The Moral Foundations of Punitive Damages, 40 Ala.
L. Rev. 705, 705-08 (1989) (analyzing punitive damage rules in terms of moral theory and
arguing that moral philosophy supports such rules); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell,
Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 869, 870-76 (1998) (arguing
that punitive damages should only be imposed if an injurer has a chance of escaping
liability for an injury it caused, and claiming that current legal rules fall short of this goal);
Symposium, The Future of Punitive Damages, 1998 Wis. L. Rev. 1, 1-426 (offering various
assessments of the "future of punitive damages").
20. See General Motors Appeals Record Lawsuit Damages, N.Y. Times, July 31, 1999,
at A9.
21. See BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574-75 & n.22 (1996).
22. See generally Developments in the Law-The Civil Jury, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 1408,
1533 & n.158 (1997) (discussing actual and proposed caps). A number of state supreme
courts have invalidated such measures. See, e.g., State ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial
Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062, 1090-95 (Ohio 1999) (striking down caps on
punitive and general damages as violating state constitutional provisions of right to jury
trial and due process).
23. See, e.g., Product Liability Reform Act of 1997, S. 648, 105th Cong. § 2(a)(2)
(1997) (listing "[e]xcessive, unpredictable, and often arbitrary damage awards" as a factor
motivating the bill). For a general discussion skeptical of the attention paid to high
awards, see Marc Galanter, Shadow Play: The Fabled Menace of Punitive Damages, 1998
1144 [Vol. 100:1139
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rights cases, most notably in sexual harassment cases.2 4 At the same time,
the problems created by punitive awards bear on related questions in
other areas of the law, involving, for example, compensatory damages for
pain and suffering, libel, and intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress. 25 Similar problems arise in the area of criminal sentencing when-
ever an administrative agency is asked to impose civil fines.2 6
Participants in the legal system are often asked to come up with some
kind ofjudgment, factual or normative, and then to "translate" that judg-
ment into a dollar award. In the area of punitive damages, it is necessary
to make some assessment of the character of the defendant's behavior,
and then to ascertain the appropriate dollar amount to be paid to the
plaintiff by way of punishment. In many domains, compensatory judg-
ments raise similar puzzles. While juries are nominally expected to find a
"fact"-what amount of money would restore the plaintiff to the status
quo ante?-it is often extremely difficult to monetize the relevant harm,
and normative judgments undoubtedly play a significant role. 27 In the
case of punitive damages, it is extremely difficult for even experts to
agree on what dollar amount constitutes adequate "punishment" or pro-
duces an appropriate deterrent signal.
In all of these areas, the legal system is pervaded by a degree of un-
predictability and variance, resulting in apparent arbitrariness, as the sim-
ilarly situated are treated differently.28 An extensive study of pain and
suffering cases found that as much as 60% of the awards consists of
Wis. L. Rev. 1, 5-11 (arguing that the concern over high awards is the result of
exaggerations).
24. See Shih & Sunstein, supra note 12 (manuscript at 1-3) (concluding that both
compensatory and punitive damage awards were "quite random" in sexual harassment
cases).
25. See, e.g., David Baldus et al., Improving Judicial Oversight of Jury Damages
Assessments: A Proposal for the Comparative Additur/Remittitur Review of Awards for
Nonpecuniary Harms and Punitive Damages, 80 Iowa L. Rev. 1109, 1112-13 (1995)
(analyzing common law methods of valuing nonpecuniary harms and discussing additur/
remittitur review as a means to control outlying awards); Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., Valuing
Life and Limb in Tort: Scheduling "Pain and Suffering," 83 Nw. U. L. Rev. 908, 909 (1989)
(proposing three alternative frameworks for valuing non-economic damages); Leebron,
supra note 13, at 288-309 (reviewing the factors that cause variability in awards for pain
and suffering prior to death).
26. See Edward L. Rubin, Punitive Damages: Reconceptualizing the Runcible
Remedies of Common Law, 1998 Wis. L. Rev. 131, 132-33.
27. See generally Patrick Atiyah, The Damages Lottery 143-50 (1997) (describing the
range of damage awards as a "lottery"); Michelle Chernikoff Anderson & Robert J.
MacCoun, Goal Conflict in Juror Assessments of Compensatory and Punitive Damages, 23
Law & Hum. Behav. 313, 327-28 (1999) (discussing two studies that suggested jurors often
fail to "compartmentalize" compensatory and punitive damages, leading to "leakage"
between the two categories).
28. See, e.g., Jonathan M. Karpoff & John R. Lott, Jr., On the Determinants and
Importance of Punitive Damages Awards, 42 J.L. & Econ. 527, 540-45 (1999) (suggesting
that punitive damage awards vary in ways not explained by injury or defendant
characteristics); Leebron, supra note 13, at 309-11 (discussing the implications of
variability in awards).
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"noise," unexplained by objective factors. 29 A study of all reported sexual
harassment cases was unable to connect either compensatory or punitive
awards to any case characteristics that might be thought to explain jury
judgments. 30 The punitive damage area is more complicated-a point to
which we will return shortly-but there is evidence of significant variabil-
ity here as well. 31 The most ambitious claims to the contrary attempt to
show that once the compensatory award has been made, the punitive
award becomes predictable to a certain degree;32 but the same data show
that at the time a case is filed (before the amount of compensatory dam-
ages is known), it is very hard to know the expected punitive award, and
that there is generally a great deal of "noise" in outcomes. 33
To understand the current study, it is necessary to understand its
predecessor by way of background. Our earlier study involved a demo-
graphically diverse set of jury-eligible citizens from Travis County,
Texas.34 The relevant experiment involved twenty-eight personal injury
cases, which respondents were asked to assess in one of three ways: outra-
geousness, on a rating scale (0 to 6); intent to punish, on a rating scale
(also 0 to 6); and actual awards, on the unbounded scale of dollars. As
noted, our principal findings were twofold. People's moral judgments
are widely shared and predictable-in fact strikingly so-at least in the
personal injury cases investigated in this study.35 But in spite of this
point, and in the presence of shared moral judgments, people's judg-
ments on a dollar scale-the scale, or "response mode," favored by the
legal system-are highly unpredictable, in the sense that the median
29. See Leebron, supra note 13, at 310.
30. See Shih & Sunstein, supra note 12 (manuscript at 1-3).
31. See Karpoff & Lott, supra note 28, at 540-45. There is some dispute over the
degree of unpredictability. Eisenberg et al., supra note 10, show that the logarithm of
punitive awards is predicted reasonably well from a set of objective characteristics of cases
in which awards were made; in particular, the authors show that the compensatory award is
a fairly good predictor of the punitive award. See id. at 644. But the authors themselves
note that the range of possible awards in regular (i.e., not logarithmic) dollars is still quite
high even after controlling for the many factors in their regression model, including
compensatory damages. For example, in their data, for a case with a $500,000
compensatory award, 5% of punitive damage awards would be $10,000 or less, but another
5% would be $6,500,000 or more. See id. at 657; see also Karpoff& Lott, supra note 28, at
540-45 (discussing the difficulty of predicting punitive damage awards and the
consequences of that difficulty).
Note also that predictability can be understood in different ways: (a) predictability
exists when case characteristics predict punitive awards; (b) predictability exists when the
judgments of one group of six or twelve predicts the judgments of another group of six or
twelve; (c) predictability exists when an actor can assess expected liability when something
goes wrong. Our principal emphasis here is on (b); Eisenberg's emphasis is on (a); both
are relevant to (c). Of course the three are closely related in practice. We offer a more
detailed treatment of predictability below. See infra Part II.B.8-9.
32. See Eisenberg et al., supra note 10, at 637-39.
33. See Karpoff & Lott, supra note 28, at 543.
34. See Sunstein, Kahneman, & Schkade, supra note 4, at 2094-108.
35. See id. at 2097-99.
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judgment of any group of twelve people is an extremely poor predictor of
the median judgment of any other group of twelve people.3 6 Lacking a
reliable understanding of how deliberation would affect individual judg-
ments, we used the median of groups of twelve individuals, randomly se-
lected from our pool of 899 citizens and combined them into a large
number of statistical juries.3 7 At least in this setting, the primary identifi-
able source of the noise is the difficulty jurors have in translating their
punitive intent into dollars. Dollar awards are highly variable despite the
existence of shared moral judgments.
To explain why the use of the dollar scale would produce variability,
we developed a theory of juror punitive damage judgments. The outrage
model assumes that ajuror's basic response to a defendant's behavior is a
reaction of outrage, which in turn leads to an intent to punish, which can
be expressed on different response scales (for example, a dollar amount
or a rating from 0 to 6). These scales vary not only in their complexity,
but also in the precision and consistency of the measurements that they
provide: Some scales are less reliable than others, in the sense that they
are less consistent at producing the same answer to the same question, or
different answers to different questions. As we have already seen, the dol-
lar scale is in this sense an extremely unreliable expression of punitive
intent, and it produces a high degree of arbitrariness.
To understand the reasons for the noise in dollar damage judg-
ments, we explored the close analogy between our findings with respect
to the dollar scale and the outcome of psychological research on the
problem of "magnitude scaling," which occurs when people are asked to
indicate the intensity of their subjective responses to stimuli-the bright-
ness of lights, the loudness of noise-along an unbounded numerical
scale.38 In some of these experiments, the participants are given a
"modulus," which specifies the number that is to be assigned to a particu-
lar standard stimulus. In other experiments, the participants are not
given a modulus. In the absence of a modulus, variability increases dra-
matically; some participants assign high numbers, others assign low num-
bers. With the dollar scale, the underlying problem is that people are
being asked to scale without a "modulus," that is, without a standard that
would help give meaning to various numbers on the scale. 39
36. See id. at 2100-03.
37. We relied on evidence suggesting that the median judgment of a group of
predeliberative individuals is a good predictor of the judgment that group will reach as a
result of deliberation. See id. at 2101 nn.127-28, citing James H. Davis, Group Decision
Making and Quantitative Judgments: A Consensus Model, in 1 Understanding Group
Behavior 35, 47 (Erich H. Witte & James H. Davis eds., 1996); Shari Diamond & Jonathan
Casper, Blindfolding the jury to Verdict Consequences, 26 L. & Soc'y Rev. 513, 553 (1992).
We noted, however, the possibility of effects of the sort we observed in the current study.
See Sunstein, Kahneman, & Schkade, supra note 4, at 2101 n.128 (noting that deliberation
may result in more extreme awards due to "amplification of bias").
38. See S.S. Stevens, Psychophysics 25-31 (1975).
39. See Sunstein, Kahneman, & Schkade, supra note 4, at 2106-07.
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The key point is that when a modulus is supplied, the variability
greatly decreases; in its absence, respondents adopt their own moduli.
Juries asked to assess punitive damage awards are in effect asked to scale
without a modulus. Unpredictable judgments are a natural result even
when people do not disagree about the significant issues4 0-even when,
that is, there is a kind of "bedrock" moral judgment in place. 41 If this
point is correct, it helps explain the observed variability in dollar awards
in many areas of the law. It also helps explain the disparities that led to
the enactment of the Sentencing Guidelines; 42 before the guidelines,
judges were being asked, in effect, to scale without a modulus, since the
relevant scale (years) has a great deal in common with the dollar scale
(i.e., bounded below at zero, but with great discretion at the high end).
Our earlier study did not, however, involve deliberating juries, and a
natural question was whether deliberating juries would produce similar
or quite different results. Perhaps deliberation would reduce variabil-
ity. 43 An alternative possibility was that the process of collective delibera-
40. For similar results in the context of compensatory pain and suffering awards, see
MichaelJ. Saks et al., Reducing Variability in Civil Jury Awards, 21 Law & Hum. Behav. 243,
243-44 (1997).
41. A similar point is made in Lane v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 60, 72
(2000) (Brown, J., concurring in the result) (citation omitted):
Significantly, the variability in punitive damage awards does not flow so much
from any inherent inability of different juries to agree on the wrongfulness of
specific conduct. Rather, it results from the way courts ask juries to measure that
wrongfulness.... The variability in punitive damage awards does not, therefore,
reflect any inconsistency injury factfinding, merely that awards are not calibrated
to a common scale.
42. See Sandra Shane-DuBow et al., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Sentencing Reform in the
United States 7 (1985).
43. In a series of papers, Michael Saks has argued that juries actually reduce
variability. Saks's early research compared twelve-person juries to six-person juries, see the
overview in Michael J. Saks, Jury Verdicts, 61, 77-92 (1977)-a comparison on which our
study here does not bear. Saks subsequently extended his research to include a
comparison between juries and judges, with the suggestion thatjuries are likely to produce
less variability by virtue of their numbers. See Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know
Anything About the Behavior of the Tort Litigation System-and Why Not?, 140 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 1147, 1269, 1271-74 (1992) [hereinafter Saks, Tort Litigation System]; MichaelJ. Saks
& Peter David Blanck, Justice Improved: The Unrecognized Benefits of Aggregation and
Sampling in the Trial of Mass Torts, 44 Stan. L. Rev. 815, 850 & n.204 (1992); Saks et al.,
supra note 40, at 243-44, 246. This conclusion is briefly challenged in Robert MacCoun,
Inside the Black Box: What Empirical Research Tells Us About Decisionmaking by Civil
Juries, in Verdict: Assessing the Civil Jury System 137, 178 n.126 (Robert E. Litan ed.,
1993) ("The argument is based on statistical sampling theory, but the analogy between
empaneled juries and random samples is an imperfect one. Though it is a plausible
hypothesis, it requires more rigorous testing than it has received to date."). We have
attempted a more rigorous test here, finding that juries produce more variability as
compared with the mean of individual predeliberation judgments. This finding suggests,
though it certainly does not prove, the possibility that juries will produce more variability
in awards than judges (a suggestion supported by the possibility that judicial experience
with a wide range of cases will introduce the equivalent of a "modulus" by which to
discipline dollar awards).
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tion would move the group further in the direction of the initial tendency
suggested by the individual judgments. In any case, a test of deliberating
juries would help to confirm or deny the wisdom of the decision to treat
the median judgment of a group of twelve as the likely judgment of any
deliberating group (for purposes of creating statistical juries). Hence our
main purpose in this Empirical Study was to examine the effects of jury
deliberation on dollar awards and, in particular, to see whether delibera-
tion would increase or decrease predictability. In the process, we also
hoped, as a secondary goal, to find out whether the original findings-
shared moral judgments but erratic awards-would be replicated with a
new sample of citizens from a different state, and with new and richer
case materials.
II. DELIBERATING JURIES: AN EXPERIMENTAL INQUIRY
A. Method
Jury-eligible citizens from Phoenix, Arizona were recruited by a sur-
vey firm and paid $35 for their participation. Each juror was randomly
assigned to a six-person jury, and each jury was assigned to a response
mode order; half of the juries judged dollar awards first and punishment
ratings second, and the other half completed the tasks in the opposite
order. Each jury judged only one case, which was the subject of both its
punishment rating (on a scale of 0 to 8) and its dollar award. Six juries
(out of a total of 480) had only five members because an insufficient
number of participants showed up at a given appointment time. A pilot
test of twenty-nine juries was conducted in Phoenix to test the materials
and procedure. Because adjustments were very minor, these juries were
added to the main sample and the combined sample was analyzed to-
gether. Therefore, a total of 3048 citizens participated in 509 juries.
The procedure consisted of four parts. In Part 1, all participants in a
given session viewed a videotape for the case they would consider, read
the corresponding written materials, and recorded their personal judg-
ment of the appropriate punitive damage award or punishment rating.
In Part 2, participants were randomly assigned to juries of six members,
which were given thirty minutes to deliberate on and reach a unanimous
verdict on a punitive damage amount or a punishment rating. In Part 3,
a new individual response form was distributed, which asked participants
to record a second personal judgment for the same case, using the type of
verdict (punishment rating or dollar damages) complementary to the
one they had already used. In Part 4, eachjury again deliberated to reach
a unanimous verdict on this second type of judgment for the same case.
Thus, for each individual, and for each jury, we have both a dollar award
and a punishment rating for the case they considered. We use the terms
dollar and punishment judgments to refer to the dollar awards and pun-
ishment ratings made by individuals. For juries we will refer to these as
dollar and punishment verdicts. For purposes of understanding real-
world behavior, the dollar awards are most important. We inquire into
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punishment ratings both to understand the relation between punishment
ratings and dollar awards, and to see the effect of deliberation on both of
these.
TABL 1. RESPONSE MODE MANIPULATION
Punishment
How much should the defendant be punished because of their ac-
tions, and to deter the defendant and others from similar actions in the
future? Note that the compensatory damages that the defendant must
pay do not count as part of the punishment. Please circle the number
that best expresses the jury's judgment of the appropriate level of
punishment.
Extremely
None Mild Substantial Severe Severe
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
$ Damages
What amount of punitive damages (if any) should the defendant be
required to pay as punishment and to deter the defendant and others
from similar actions in the future? Note that the compensatory damages
that the defendant must pay do not count as part of the punishment.
Please write the amount of punitive damages that the jury agreed on in the
blank below.
The case materials consisted of fifteen personal injury scenarios
(summarized in Table 2).44 An example is provided in the Appendix. A
videotape was prepared for each case, in which a professional actor read
the text of the case and all instructions aloud. To maximize comprehen-
sion, participants were required both to view the videotape and to read
the written version. The size of the defendant firm (annual profits of
$100-$200 million) and compensatory damages ($200,000) were the
same for all cases. Thus, the variability we observe cannot be accounted
for by a model that depends on variability in compensatory damage
awards or in the defendant's ability to pay.
B. Results
1. Preliminaries. - Notwithstanding the half-hour time limit for de-
liberation, 91% of juries reached a unanimous verdict on a punishment
rating (a total of 461 verdicts) and 82% of juries reached a unanimous
44. Of these, 10 were more elaborate versions of the same scenarios used in
Kahneman, Schkade, & Sunstein, supra note 4, at 79-84, and five were completely new
scenarios which, like the first 10, were based on real cases (Table 2). The main substantive
elaboration on the original scenarios was the addition of a paragraph of closing arguments
by the attorneys for each side.
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TABLE 2. SUMMARY OF PERSONAL INJURY SCENARIOS
Case
Williams v. National Motors
Smith v. Public Entertainment
Douglas v. Coastal Industries
Sanders v. A&G Cosmetics
Stanley v. Gersten Productions
Glover v. General Assistance
Lawson v. TGI International
Newton v. Novel Clothing
West v. MedTech
Windsor v. Int'l Computers
Reynolds v. Marine Sulfur
Crandall v. C&S Railroad
Dulworth v. Global Elevator
Hughes v. Jardel
Nelson v. Trojan Yachts
verdict on a dollar award
Description
Motorcycle driver injured when brakes fail
Circus patron shot in arm by drunk security
guard
Auto airbag opens unexpectedly, injuring driver
Man suffers skin damage from using baldness
cure
Elderly woman suffers back injuries from using
exercise video
Child ingests large quantity of allergy medicine,
needs hospital stay
Employee suffers anemia due to benzene
exposure on the job
Small child playing with matches burned when
pajamas catch fire
Disabled man injured when wheelchair lift
malfunctions
Secretary chronically ill due to radiation from
computer monitor
Seaman injured when molten sulfur container
fails
Train hits car at crossing, injuring driver
Shopper injured in fall when escalator suddenly
stops
Store employee raped in mall parking lot
Man nearly drowns when defective boat sinks
(a total of 416 verdicts). The remainder had
not reached a verdict when the time limit expired; these were treated as
hung. All further analyses were conducted on the 401 juries that reached
both a punishment verdict and a dollar verdict.45 Because there were no
statistically significant differences between the verdicts of juries that
judged dollars first and those that judged punishment first, we analyzed
together the verdicts made by dollar-first juries and punishment-first
juries.
2. Overview: How Do the Verdicts of DeliberatingJuries Compare to Those of
Statistical Juries? - We assessed the effect of deliberation on juror judg-
ments by comparing each jury's verdict to the median predeliberation
45. We chose the more conservative path of focusing on juries with complete
responses to ensure that comparisons between punishment and dollar verdicts, and
between individuals and juries, were based on the same set of respondents. Recreating our
Tables and Figures with all available responses produces the same pattern of results, with
some slight differences in exact numbers.
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TABLE 3. MEDIAN VERDICTS FOR DELIBERATING AND STATISTICAL JURIES
Punishment Verdicts
Statistical
Juies
5.5
5.0
4.3
5.0
5.5
5.0
5.0
4.5
4.0
4.0
3.5
3.0
1.0
0.3
0.0
Deliberating
Juries
6.0
5.0
4.5
5.0
6.0
5.0
5.0
5.0
4.0
4.0
3.0
2.0
1.5
0.0
0.0
Dollar Verdicts
Average
DSM
15%
1%
4%
14%
19%
20%
12%
9%
11%
-8%
-8%
-26%
0%
-15%
3%
Statistical
Juries
1,875,000
1,000,000
475,000
550,000
325,000
450,000
450,000
500,000
225,000
200,000
50,500
37,500
0
0
0
Deliberating
Juries
10,000,000
4,000,000
2,000,000
1,500,000
1,000,000
1,000,000
1,000,000
1,000,000
500,000
500,000
100,000
50,000
0
0
0
Mean of Top 5 5.1 5.3 11% 845,000 3,700,000 51%
Mean of Middle 5 4.5 4.6 9% 365,000 800,000 40%
Mean of Bottom 5 1.6 1.3 -9% 17,600 30,000 21%
Overall Mean 3.7 3.7 3% 409,200 1,510,000 37%
judgment of the individuals who composed thatjury. We will refer to the
median predeliberation judgment of the individuals in a jury as the ver-
dict of the statistical jury. To evaluate the effects of deliberation, we com-
pare the verdicts of deliberating juies with those of statistical juries.
The results observed for the fifteen cases are shown in Table 3.46
The cases are arranged in the Table in descending order of the median
dollar verdict of deliberatingjuries. Note first that the median verdicts of
deliberating and statistical juries produce very similar rankings of the
cases. For dollars, there is a Spearman rank correlation 47 of .88 between
the deliberating and statistical jury verdicts in Table 3; for punishment
verdicts the average rank correlation is even higher, at .98. The correla-
tion between punishment verdicts and dollar verdicts is also high, at .87.
These results confirm the finding of earlier research that, in the aggre-
gate, judgments of punitive intent and of dollar awards share the same
core of moral outrage, and therefore produce the same ordering of cases.
While there is agreement on the ordering of cases, the level of ver-
dicts tells a different tale. Punishment verdicts are, on average, quite
close for statistical and deliberating juries, but dollar verdicts show a dra-
46. The columns labeled DSM are explained below, at Part II.B.4.
47. The Spearman rank correlation is an index of agreement between rankings that is
analogous to first converting each column to ranks (from I to 15 in this case) and then
computing the correlation between the two sets of ranks.
Case
Reynolds
Glover
Lawson
Williams
Smith
Nelson
Hughes
West
Douglas
Crandall
Sanders
Windsor
Stanley
Dulworth
Newton
Average
DSM
54%
52%
53%
46%
52%
48%
45%
34%
40%
35%
25%
38%
0%
17%
23%
1152 [Vol. 100:1139
HeinOnline  -- 100 Colum. L. Rev. 1152 2000
DELIBERATING ABOUT DOLLARS
matic difference: Deliberating juries produce much higher awards, espe-
cially but not only at the high end. Indeed, 83% of the 330 non-zero
dollar verdicts were above the median individual judgment for that jury.
This is the most important finding in the study: the severity shift in dollar
verdicts.
In summary, then, aggregate verdicts from deliberating and statisti-
cal juries show strong agreement on the relative egregiousness of the
cases, and for punishment verdicts, they do not dramatically diverge. De-
liberating juries, however, produce dollar verdicts that far exceed the me-
dian judgments of the jurors that compose them. We now try to under-
stand how this pattern might occur. To do so, we divide verdicts into
three decisions: (1) the decision about whether to punish at all; (2) the
decision about the appropriate punishment verdict; and (3) the decision
about the appropriate dollar verdict. As we shall see, the effects of delib-
eration are quite different for each decision.
3. Punish or Not Punish: A Majority Model. - The first decision for a
jury is, presumably, whether to punish or to reject punishment by a ver-
dict of $0 in damages or a 0 punishment rating. Table 4 shows the per-
centage of non-zero verdicts that were made by juries, in relation to the
initial distribution ofjudgments among the jurors. The pattern is identi-
cal for punishment and dollar verdicts: When a majority of juror judg-
ments (i.e., four or more) are 0, the jury verdict is virtually certain to itself
be 0. When a majority ofjurors have non-zero judgments, the jury verdict
is virtually certain not to be 0. Finally, if the jury is evenly split, the
chance of a 0 verdict is about 50-50.
Without detailed analysis of the deliberation transcripts, we do not
know whether juries actually voted or explicitly agreed to adopt a major-
ity decision rule. We observe only that the pattern of results is consistent
with the adoption of such a rule. In contrast to other phases of the jury
decision that we consider later, there is no evidence of any systematic
effect of deliberation on outcomes (i.e.,juries were neither more nor less
likely to punish than their jurors). Thus, for the decision of whether or
not to impose punitive damages, there is no indication of any asymmetry
of power or influence betweenjurors who were initially inclined to say yes
and those who were inclined to say no.
TABLE 4. PERCENTAGE OF NON-ZERO VERDICTS AS A FUNCTION OF
PREDELIBERATION JUDGMENTS
Jury Verdicts
Individual Predeliberation Non-Zero Non-Zero
Judgments Punishment Ratings $ Awards
Majority non-zero 99% 98%
Even split 48% 45%
Majority zero 8% 4%
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4. Deliberation Shift Analysis. - We now turn to the severity of punish-
ment verdicts chosen by the juries that determined that some punish-
ment was appropriate. We wish to examine the relationship between the
postdeliberation verdict of a jury and the predeliberation distribution of
judgments among its members. For this purpose we introduce a delibera-
tion shift analysis, which we will apply to both punishment ratings and
dollar awards. The predeliberation judgments of jurors are first ranked,
from the most lenient to the most severe; the eventual verdict of the jury
is then inserted in that ordering, and its rank is computed. For example,
suppose that the individual jurors had predeliberation judgments of $0,
$200,000, $300,000, $500,000, $1,000,000, and $5,000,000, and that the
jury verdict was $750,000. The jury verdict ranks fifth in the distribution
of individual judgments of its members. In this instance, the jury was
more severe than four of its original members, and less severe than two of
its members, indicating that, overall, deliberation made judgments more
severe.
If the outcomes of deliberation were determined by a simple voting
model, the jury verdict would always be in the middle of the distribution
of initial judgments, at the median. There would be no shift, either to-
ward greater leniency or toward more punishment. With no shift, for a
jury of six (with the jury verdict added as the seventh member), the pre-
dicted position of the jury in the distribution of the opinions of its mem-
bers is always fourth.48 The deliberation shift measure (DSM) is the difference
between the observed and the predicted rank of the jury verdict, as a
percentage of the maximum possible shift in the direction taken. To con-
tinue our dollar example above, since the jury verdict ranks fifth among
its jurors' predeliberation judgments, the difference would be 5 - 4 = 1.
For ajury of six, the maximum possible upward shift is 7 - 4 = 3, and the
DSM would be 1/3, or 33%. This means that the rank of the jury verdict
was 33% of the way from the rank of the median juror (4) to the rank of
the maximum juror (7).49 The DSM is positive if the jury is more severe
than its median member; it is negative if the jury is more lenient than its
median member. If the jury verdict was higher than the judgment of the
maximum juror, the DSM would be 100%; if it was lower than the judg-
ment of the minimum juror, the DSM would be -100%. To study the
systematic effects of deliberation, we computed the DSM for every non-
hung jury, separately for punishment verdicts and for dollar verdicts. Ta-
ble 3 shows the mean values of the DSM for each of the fifteen cases, for
both punishment and dollar verdicts.
5. Punishment Ratings Either Up or Down. - For punishment verdicts
there is a clear pattern in the results, which can be observed both in the
column of DSM values and by comparing the statistical and deliberated
48. For a jury of 12, the expected rank would be 7; for a jury of nine, the expected
rank would be 5.5; and so forth.
49. Because the DSM is formulated as a percentage, it can be computed for, and has
the same interpretation for, a jury of any size.
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verdicts: Deliberation increased the severity of punishment for high-pun-
ishment cases and reduced it for low-punishment cases. Reading down
the table, the DSM is positive for nine of the top ten cases, and negative
for four of the bottom five cases. There was a severity shift for the high-
punishment cases, and a leniency shift for the low-punishment cases.
Because the table is arranged roughly in decreasing order of punitive
intent, we can see that the DSM is positive for high-punishment cases
(average for the top ten cases is 10%) and negative for low-punishment
cases (average for the bottom five cases is -9%). Further, the correlation
between the DSM and the median statistical jury verdicts is .67, which
means that the more severe the individual predeliberation judgments,
the greater the shift. In the language of the group polarization literature,
we observe systematic choice shifts, in which deliberation generally in-
creases differences among cases, by making severe verdicts more severe
and lenient verdicts more lenient, relative to the predeliberation judg-
ments of jurors.
6. Dollar Awards and the Severity Shift: Deliberation Increases Punitive
Damages. - We now turn to the task of understanding the remarkable
difference between the dollar awards obtained from deliberating juries
and those obtained from a statistical pooling of the predeliberation opin-
ions of jury members. The basic result is that deliberation causes awards
to increase, and it causes high awards to increase a great deal. As ex-
treme but actual illustrations of the severity shift, consider a few examples
from the raw data:
" A jury whose predeliberation judgments were $200,000,
$300,000, $2 million, $10 million, $10 million, and $10 mil-
lion reached a verdict of $15 million.
" A jury whose predeliberation judgments were $200,000,
$500,000, $2 million, $5 million, and $10 million reached a
verdict of $50 million.
" A jury whose predeliberation judgments were $2 million, $2
million, $2.5 million, $50 million, and $100 million reached
a verdict of $100 million.
Now consider the DSM column for dollar verdicts in Table 3. Recall
that the value of the DSM is positive if the jury verdict is more severe than
the median judgment of its jurors and negative if the jury is more lenient.
The pattern of results is clear: The DSM is generally positive, indicating
that deliberation generally produced a severity shift. Furthermore, the
DSM for dollar verdicts is much higher for high-punishment cases than
for low-punishment cases: The correlation between the median punish-
ment verdict and the DSM for dollar verdicts is .95.
The difference between deliberating and statistical juries is very
large, especially for the high-punishment cases: For the top ten cases in
Table 3, the average DSM of 46% means that the jury verdict is about
halfway between the second-highest and third-highest individual judg-
ments. Even more surprising, for the ten high-punishment cases, 10% of
jury verdicts were even higher than the highest individual judgment (i.e.,
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the DSM was 100% for thesejuries). A further 17% of verdicts were equal
to the highest individual judgment (i.e., a DSM of 83%). These extreme
verdicts were less common for the five low-punishment cases, in which
15% of verdicts equaled the highest individual judgment, and none ex-
ceeded this maximum. The pattern is clear: Deliberation made dollar
verdicts more severe, especially for high-punishment cases.
Notably, we did not find that the degree of dispersion between indi-
vidual predeliberation judgments contributed to greater or lesser shifts as
a result of deliberation. For example, for juries with non-zero verdicts for
the same case, the average correlation between the standard deviation of
individual judgments (a measure of dispersion) and the DSM was -. 05 for
dollars and .08 for punishment (neither correlation is statistically differ-
ent from 0). In other words, juries whose members were in rough agree-
ment (i.e., had a low standard deviation) about dollars or punishment
did not show a different shift from groups whose members were in sub-
stantial disagreement about dollars or punishment.
7. Do People from Arizona Agree with People from Texas? The Effects of
Geography, Race, Gender, Education, Age, and Wealth. - A subsidiary but
nonetheless important question is whether the findings of the earlier
study were replicated under the current study's changes in stimuli, proce-
dure, and sample. The answer is that the previous results were replicated
in every essential respect. The findings in the Texas study were replicated
in Arizona, and despite evident differences between the two regions, peo-
ple from the two areas evaluated cases in the same way. As before, dollars
and ratings produced very similar rankings of the cases (a rank correla-
tion of .90 compared to .91 for the comparable condition in the previous
study5 0 ). Different demographic groups again produced very similar av-
erage evaluations, as indicated by the extremely high correlations in Ta-
ble 5.
In addition, the ordering of case evaluations closely matched that in
our previous study. There are ten cases common to both studies, and
evaluations made by Texans in the previous study were highly predictive
of those made by Arizonans in the current study-the rank correlation
between the two samples was .90 for punishment ratings and .98 for dol-
lar awards. Thus, the current, larger study, with several nontrivial
changes, confirmed the conclusion of our previous study that individual
moral judgments are predictable and shared, but expressing them in dol-
lars produces unpredictability and confusion.
50. This correlation was computed for the condition in the previous study, see
Sunstein, Kahneman, & Schkade, supra note 4, that is directly comparable to the current
study, which contained cases with large companies and high harm.
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TABLE 5. CORRELATION BETWEEN DEMOGRAPHIC GROUPS ON INTENDED
SEVERITY OF PUNISHMENT*
Men
Gender Women .99
Ethnicity
White Hispanic
Hispanic .92
Other .88 .81
<$30K $30-50K
Household $30-50K .98
Income >$50K .99 .99
<30 30-39 40-49
Age 30-39 .97
40-49 .96 .97
>50 .96 .97 .97
* Entries are correlations between mean responses to scenarios by respondents in the indicated
demographic categories.
8. With Respect to Dollars, How Predictable Are Jury Verdicts? - An im-
portant goal of the legal system is to treat the similarly situated similarly.
Our previous study showed that both the dollar judgments of individuals
and the dollar verdicts of statistical juries would probably fail this test of
procedural justice, because of a high degree of unpredictability in dam-
age awards for the same case, as well as inconsistency in distinguishing
between cases of more and less egregious conduct. 51 Among many in the
legal community there is the hope, and indeed the conviction, that delib-
eration by a group of jurors will overcome individual biases and produce
more just and more predictable verdicts. As will be seen, our findings
lend no support to this view.
The simplest and most practical criterion for predictability is re-
flected in the distribution of possible verdicts for a given case (a criterion
that asks the extent to which the identically situated are treated identi-
cally). This is of course a critical piece of information for a lawyer advis-
ing a client about whether or not to settle a dispute, or for an actor con-
templating liability for a potentially tortious course of conduct. In our
sample, we had multiple independent juries rendering punitive damage
verdicts for the same case, and this information can be used to estimate
verdict distributions. Table 6 presents selected distributional statistics for
each case. The range of possible dollar verdicts is strikingly large. For
example, each of the top five cases has a minimum award of $500,000 or
less, and yet the average maximum award for these cases is over
51. See id. at 2077-78, 2100-03.
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$83,000,000. Further, the maximum verdicts are 10 to 500 times as large
as the median verdicts (for cases with non-zero medians). Even for the
three cases at the bottom with zero medians (i.e., a majority of juries for
that case awarded no punitive damages), plaintiffs could still be awarded
$500,000. Also, although there is considerable noise (in part because the
number of juries for each case is relatively small), the range of verdicts
for a given case tends to increase in proportion to the median verdict.5 2
Note that these variations between juries occurred on identical presenta-
tions of identical facts, unaffected by differences in (for example) com-
pensatory awards or lawyers' presentations.
To make the uncertainty of these dollar verdicts more concrete, im-
agine that a statistically sophisticated and greatly experienced lawyer is
advising a defendant about a possible punitive damages award, on the
basis of the data illustrated by Table 6. For the purpose of the illustra-
tion, assume that the lawyer is not only sophisticated but also wise, and
able to make unbiased predictions ofjury decisions: When she states that
her best guess is an award of $X, the actual award is equally likely to be
above or below X (this is her estimate of the median award). On the
basis of our data the lawyer would be able to provide the client with the
following information:
"My best guess is that you will face ajudgment of $X. There are
equal chances that it will be higher or lower than this amount.
However, there is a lot of uncertainty about how much higher or
lower it will be: There is a 10% chance that you will have to pay
more than a times that amount, and there is a 10% chance that
you will have to pay less than 1/b of that amount."
Averaging across cases, the best estimates53 of a and b, respectively,
are 7.74 and 6.61. On the basis of these values, a lawyer who prediits a
verdict of $2 million should also estimate that there is a 10% chance that
the actual verdict will be over $15.48 million, and a 10% chance that it
will be less than $0.30 million. Because the range increases proportion-
ately with the median (except for noise), the same values of a and b apply
for any value of $X.5 4 Finally, these estimates assume a jury of six. The
uncertainty would very likely be reduced somewhat with a larger jury.55
52. We observed a similar pattern in our previous study. See Kahneman, Schkade, &
Sunstein, supra note 4, at 69.
53. To obtain these estimates, we computed the 90th percentile/median and
median/10th percentile ratios for each case, and then computed the geometric mean
across cases for each ratio. The estimates reported here are for the nine cases that have
neither a median of zero nor a 10th percentile of zero (see Table 6).
54. To test for proportionality, we ran a regression of the difference between the 90th
and 10th percentiles for a given case on the median for that case. If the range goes up
proportionately with the median, then this regression should have a good fit, and the
constant in the regression should be close to zero. In fact, the line fits quite well (R2 = .66)
and the constant is not significantly different from zero (p > .05).
55. Because statistical uncertainty is proportional to the size of the jury, we can
approximate how much smaller a and b would be for a jury of 12, under the assumption
that uncertainty in deliberating juries would diminish at the same rate as in a statistical
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TABLE 6. PERCENTILES OF JURY DOLLAR VERDICTS, BY CASE
(IN THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS)
Minimum Median Maximum
Case 0th 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 100th
Reynolds 250 1000 3500 10,000 17,500 50,000 100,000
Glover 500 1000 1250 4000 10,000 50,000 100,000
Lawson 200 250 1000 2000 6000 15,000 100,000
Williams 100 200 700 1500 5000 10,000 15,500
Smith 0 100 300 1000 7000 20,000 100,000
Nelson 100 250 500 1000 5000 5000 100,000
Hughes 0 200 850 1000 2000 20,000 40,000
West 1 200 500 1000 2000 4000 10,000
Crandall 0 50 250 500 1450 2000 100,000
Douglas 0 1 250 500 1000 25,000 50,000
Sanders 0 0 0 100 500 1000 50,000
Windsor 0 0 0 50 400 5000 25,000
Newton 0 0 0 0 75 200 500
Dulworth 0 0 0 0 40 300 500
Stanley 0 0 0 0 25 250 500
Mean of Top 5 210 510 1350 3700 9100 29,000 83,100
Mean of Middle 5 20 140 470 800 2290 11,200 60,000
Mean of Bottom 5 0 0 0 30 208 1350 15,300
Overall Mean 77 217 607 1510 3866 13,850 52,800
9. Are Deliberating Juries More Predictable Than Statistical Juries? - In
the Introduction, we asked whether deliberating juries would produce
dollar verdicts that are more predictable than those of statistical juries.
We can now use the a and b analysis set forth above 56 to answer this ques-
tion. As with the verdicts of deliberating juries, variability in the verdicts
of statistical juries is roughly proportional to the median verdict.57 We
can apply the same procedure as before to estimate the factors a and b,
which measure the estimated relationship of the 10th and 90th percen-
tiles for each case to the median award for that case.
For statistical juries, our estimates of a and b are 2.88 and 4.11, which
are both far lower than the corresponding figures of 6.61 and 7.74 for
deliberating juries. In our example above, the lawyer's predicted range
for a statistical jury verdict would be from $0.69 to $8.22 million com-
pared to the range for a deliberating jury verdict of $0.30 to $15.48 mil-
jury. In this case, since the jury would be twice as large, we divide a and b by the square
root of 2. The resulting estimates are a = 4.67 and b = 5.47, which in the lawyer advice
example would produce a predicted verdict range of $0.43 million to $10.94 million.
56. See supra Part II.B.8.
57. To test for proportionality, we ran a regression of the difference between the 90th
and 10th percentiles of statistical jury verdicts for a given case on the median for that case,
just as we did for deliberative jury verdicts, as discussed supra at note 54. Again, the line
fits fairly well (R2 = .56), and the constant is not significantly different from zero (p > .05).
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lion. Obviously, there is far less uncertainty about the verdicts of statisti-
cal juries than about those of deliberating juries.
This pattern is remarkably consistent across cases. There is greater
uncertainty in deliberating jury verdicts than in statistical jury verdicts for
each of the ten cases for which a can be calculated (those with non-zero
medians), and greater uncertainty for eleven of the twelve cases for which
b can be calculated (those with non-zero 10th percentiles). It is impor-
tant to note that this estimation procedure effectively controls for the
severity shift, and therefore that these differences are not due merely to
the generally higher level of verdicts by deliberatingjuries. We conclude,
rather to our surprise, that deliberation is a significantly poorer way of
aggregating opinions than is statistical pooling-at least if the goal is to
decrease the arbitrary unpredictability of awards.
III. WHAT HAPPENED? SEVERITY SHIFrs, RHETORICAL ASYMMETRY, AND
RELATED PHENOMENA
We now turn to a discussion of these results. We emphasize three
phenomena. The first is identified for the first time here, while the sec-
ond and third have been studied in many previous experiments.
" The first and most important phenomenon is the severity
shift. We believe that this occurred because of a rhetorical
asymmetry that gives one set of arguments an automatic,
other-things-equal upper hand in a group discussion, so that
groups will typically shift in the direction holding that upper
hand.
" The second phenomenon, described standardly though
somewhat vaguely as a "choice shift," occurs when the deci-
sion of a group shifts toward a more extreme version of the
view held, before deliberation, by the group's median mem-
ber.5 8 Our evidence clearly shows choice shifts with respect
to punishment verdicts, and because high awards increased
much more than low awards, we think that something similar
played a role in dollar verdicts as well.
" The third phenomenon, known as "group polarization," oc-
curs when individuals, polled privately after group discus-
sion, shift toward a more extreme point in the direction set
by the original distribution of views.59 Because our jurors
were not polled privately after discussion, we do not have di-
rect evidence of group polarization, though there is reason
to believe that it may have occurred. 60
58. See, e.g., Zuber et al., supra note 3, at 50.
59. See id. Choice shift and group polarization ordinarily accompany one another,
although it is possible to have one kind of movement without the other. See id. at 59.
60. See Roger Brown, Social Psychology 229 (2d ed. 1986) ("In every [mock jury
study] where the report of data makes it possible to check, group polarization occurs."
(citations omitted)). Brown infers group polarization from the fact that "for ninety
percent ofjuries that must reach unanimous agreement and do not hang, the final verdict
is consistent in direction with the majority on the initial ballot." Id. Similarly, it is
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A. The Severity Shift and Rhetorical Asymmetry
1. Rhetorical Asymmetry. - By far the most striking finding in our data
is the severity shift produced by deliberation. What mechanism causes a
jury to decide on an award that exceeds the initial judgment of its median
member-and sometimes to exceed the highest predeliberation judg-
ment of all its members?
We hypothesize that a feature of deliberation, a rhetorical asymme-
try, helps produce the one-way movement that we observe. Specifically,
we hypothesize that once the jury has agreed that there will be a non-zero
dollar award, the arguments for a larger award have a rhetorical advan-
tage and are more persuasive. If this is the case, then a jury would be
drawn disproportionately toward the larger predeliberation judgments of
its jurors. No such asymmetry would be expected for the punishment
scale, if it is hypothesized that social norms give the advantage, not to
anyone arguing that the conduct of a corporate defendant was "worse" in
the abstract, but to anyone arguing for a higher dollar award against a
corporate defendant. The key point has to do with the translation of a
punishment judgment into a dollar award; those who argue that "more"
money is necessary to punish a corporation appear to have the upper
hand. The unbounded dollar scale affords great latitude in the expres-
sion of what "more" means.
To examine the hypothesis of rhetorical asymmetry more directly, we
asked eighty-seven University of Chicago law students whether it would be
harder to argue for a smaller or a larger award. In this study, respondents
were simply told that they were deliberating about punitive damage
awards and were given no details of any particular case. They were first
asked to generate arguments for a higher or lower award, and then asked
which award (higher or lower) would be easier to justify. Half of the
students were asked to argue for a higher award; half were asked to argue
for a lower one. After generating the relevant arguments, they were
asked to complete a second task, presented as follows:
Imagine that ajury in a civil trial is deliberating about a personal
injury case in which the defendant is a large corporation (with
annual profits of approximately $200 million). The jury has al-
ready (a) unanimously ordered the defendant to pay an amount
of compensatory damages that fully compensates the plaintiff,
and (b) unanimously concluded that while the underlying con-
duct was not truly horrendous, it was sufficiently reckless to jus-
tify an award of punitive damages as well (in addition to com-
pensatory damages).
reasonable to infer, from the dramatic choice shifts we observe, that group polarization is
highly likely, in the sense that individuals will likely have shifted in the direction indicated
by the group's decisions.
For a general overview and discussion, with many applications to legal problems, see
Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? When Groups Go to Extremes, 110 Yale L.J.
(forthcoming Oct. 2000).
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In general, which position would you expect to be harder for a
juror to argue for in a deliberation? (please circle the letter of
your answer)
[15%] a) it is harder to argue that damages should be higher
[55%] b) it is harder to argue that damages should be lower
[30%] c) the positions are equally hard to argue for
The students were expressly told not to begin the second task (assess-
ing the comparative difficulty question) until after they had completed
the first (making arguments one way or the other).61
The results confirmed our hypothesis: A clear majority (55%)
thought that arguing for a lower award would be the more difficult rhe-
torical position. Further, of those who showed a preference, the margin
was almost four to one that arguing for a larger award is easier. More-
over, being asked to justify a higher or lower award had no effect; both
groups agreed that it is harder to argue for a lower award. Note that the
University of Chicago study closely followed the jury study, in that the
former, like the latter, involved a corporate defendant with $200 million
in annual profits. It seems likely, then, that a rhetorical asymmetry
played a substantial role in producing jury verdicts consistently above the
median individual judgment, and sometimes even above the highest indi-
vidual judgment.
2. Some Remaining Questions. - This finding of rhetorical asymmetry
raises many issues. The concept can be understood in many ways. Taken
very broadly, rhetorical asymmetry is ubiquitous: In any social arrange-
ment containing norms, those who argue in the direction that is norma-
tive will have the advantage. Those who argue that slavery was wonderful,
or that the Holocaust never happened, or that animals should be made to
suffer, in a context where these positions are normative, will be at a rhe-
torical advantage compared to those who claim the opposite. A similar
rhetorical asymmetry might also be at work in other deliberative contexts.
We might imagine, for example, settings in which those arguing for
higher criminal punishments would have a rhetorical advantage; it is also
possible to imagine places in which people arguing for lower taxes would
have an easier time in any debate.
Narrow understandings of rhetorical asymmetry are possible and, for
many purposes, more useful. Our claim here is quite narrow: that when
people are asking "how much" questions in deliberating about punitive
damage awards in dollars, one side has a systematic advantage, even if the
underlying moral judgments are identical (as measured on the bounded pun-
ishment scale). Would the same effect be found in deliberations about
compensatory awards for libel, sexual harassment, and pain and suffer-
ing? Would the same effect be found for punitive damage awards if the
defendant were not a corporation? If the plaintiff were a corporation?
61. For a full reproduction of the questions used in this study, see infra Appendix B.
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We turn to some normative issues below; 6 2 for the moment we note sim-
ply that there is much room for further study here.
3. An Alternative Possibility: The Mean Juror Hypothesis. - Another ex-
planation for the severity shift would suggest that groups move toward the
mean of individual dollar judgments, rather than the median. Because
individual dollar judgments are skewed to the right, and include many
extreme judgments, the mean will be above the median (this is true for
91% of juries), and could account, in theory, for the higher level of ver-
dicts. From an analysis of our data, our basic conclusion is that while it is
possible that movement toward the mean may have played some role in
producing severity shifts, such movement cannot fundamentally account
for them. The simplest demonstration of this comes from the fact that
27% of non-zero jury dollar verdicts were as high as or higher than that of
the highest predeliberation dollar judgment of individuals. A fuller ex-
planation requires a more detailed analysis.
To examine the hypothesis that the mean of individual awards would
predict jury dollar verdicts and hence the severity shift, we recomputed
the statistical jury results using the mean individual judgment, rather
than the median. 63 As expected, the mean juror produces higher statisti-
cal jury dollar verdicts than the median juror, although these are still
lower than 64% of non-zero deliberative jury verdicts (albeit an improve-
ment over the 83% figure for the median juror). This partial success,
however, comes at a high price. Even though the mean juror's award is
consistently higher than the median juror's award (and seemingly closer
to jury verdicts), the mean is less reliable, and is actually a worse predictor
of jury verdicts on the conventional measures of predictive success, than
is the median: It explains less of the variance in jury verdicts (4% vs.
26%), and has larger prediction errors on average (compared to the me-
dian juror predictions, the root-mean-square error64 for the mean juror is
2.21 times larger, and the mean absolute error is 1.53 times larger). The
choice between the median and the mean is mainly a matter of choosing
between types of errors-with the median juror, the statistical jury's ver-
dict is almost always too low, but almost never disastrously wrong. With
the mean juror the signs of the errors are more balanced (2/3 too low
and 1/3 too high), but there can occasionally be huge positive errors
62. See infra Part IV.
63. For punishment verdicts (for clarity, not depicted here), switching to the mean as
the basis for statistical juries has little effect because of the low level of skewness in the
distribution of punishment judgments.
64. The root-mean-square error (RMSE) is calculated by first computing the
differences between the predicted verdict (i.e., the median or average of predeliberation
jurors) and the actual verdict (the jury verdict), taking the square of each difference, and
then taking the square root of the average squared difference. In regression, the predicted
value of the regression equation plays the same role as the mean or median do here, and
the RMSE is thus analogous to the standard error of a regression (the estimate of a). The
mean absolute error (MAE) is computed by taking the average of the absolute values (i.e.,
the magnitude, regardless of its sign) of the differences.
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(i.e., mean juror far above the jury verdict).65 Thus, even if the mean
juror with its higher overall levels did fit jury verdicts better (and it does
not), we would still need to account for a consistent upward movement in
jury verdicts, relative to the mean juror, and for those verdicts that are at
or above the maximum juror judgment, predeliberation.
B. Choice Shifts and Group Polarization
1. The Data and Some Central Ideas. - Our study shows what is con-
ventionally called a "choice shift" with respect to punishment ratings,
pivoting around the rating of "3."66 Choice shifts of this general sort are
common consequences of deliberation, and they have been found in
many diverse tasks. The result is that groups often go in more extreme
directions-both higher or lower on the relevant scale-than would the
typical or average individual in the group. As noted, the related phenom-
enon of group polarization-for which we did not test here-occurs
when individuals move to a more extreme position in the direction indi-
cated by the mean of predeliberation judgments. We offer a brief sum-
mary of relevant literature.
With respect to group polarization, consider some examples from
relevant experiments. (a) A group with moderately profeminist attitudes
becomes more strongly profeminist after discussion. 6 7 (b) Citizens of
France become more critical of the United States and its intentions with
respect to economic aid after discussion. 68 (c) After discussion, whites
predisposed to show racial prejudice offer more negative responses to the
question whether white racism is responsible for conditions faced by Afri-
can Americans in American cities. 69 (d) After discussion, whites predis-
posed not to show racial prejudice offer more positive responses to the
same question. 70 Choice shifts and group polarization stem from similar
mechanisms, and for punishment ratings, the pattern described above is
exactly what would be predicted from the literature on choice shifts. 71
65. This is usually due to the presence of one or two extremely high individual
judgments in a jury.
66. That is, when the median individual judgement is above 3, the jury verdict tends
to move up; when the median individual judgement is 3 or less, the jury verdict tends to
move down.
67. See David G. Myers, Discussion-Induced Attitude Polarization, 28 Hum. Rel. 699,
707-11 (1975).
68. See Brown, supra note 60, at 223-24 (describing experiment published in Serge
Moscovici & Marisa Zavalloni, The Group as a Polarizer of Attitudes, 12 J. Personality &
Soc. Psychol. 125 (1969)).
69. See David G. Myers & George D. Bishop, Discussion Effects on Racial Attitudes,
169 Science 778, 778-79 (1970).
70. See id.
71. There is one difference: In the usual choice shift and group polarization studies,
the phenomenon is defined by reference to scales having two sides, with a "neutral"
midpoint, usually defined as zero (signaling neutrality on a question or no opinion). This
is the arrangement by which it makes sense to speak of initial dispositions and their
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2. Risky Shifts. - Before 1961, conventional wisdom had been that as
compared with the individuals who compose it, a group of deci-
sionmakers-for example, a committee or board-would be likely to
favor a compromise and thus to avoid risks.72 But the relevant experi-
ments, originally conducted by James Stoner, found otherwise; they iden-
tified what has become known as the "risky shift."7 3 Deliberation tended
to shift individual members in the direction of greater risk-taking (group
polarization); and deliberating groups, asked to reach a unanimous deci-
sion, were generally more risk-inclined-sometimes far more risk-in-
clined-than the mean individual member, predeliberation (choice
shift).
In Stoner's original data, subsequent researchers noticed, the largest
risky shifts could be found when group members "had a quite extreme
risky initial position," in the sense that the predeliberation votes were
weighted toward the risky end, "whereas the item [s] that shifted a little or
not at all started out near the middle of the scale." 74 Discussion among
very cautious individuals would produce a significant shift toward greater
caution; discussion among individuals inclined toward risk-taking would
produce a significant shift toward greater risk-taking; and discussion
among individuals in the middle would produce smaller shifts in the di-
rection indicated by their original disposition. In short, "group discus-
sion moves decisions to more extreme points in the direction of the original
inclination .... which means shift to either risk or caution in the direction
of the original disposition, and the size of shift increases with the degree
of initial polarization."75 Similar results have been found in many con-
aggravation. Our punishment ratings, by contrast, lacked an obvious neutral midpoint,
and of course dollar awards have no such midpoint.
72. We draw in this and the following paragraph on Brown, supra note 60, at 200-06
(discussing the phenomenon called the "risky shift" in the context of group polarization).
73. See James A.F. Stoner, Risky and Cautious Shifts in Group Decisions: The
Influence of Widely Held Values, 4 J. Experimental Soc. Psychol. 442 (1968); James A.F.
Stoner, A Comparison of Individual and Group Decisions Including Risk (1961)
(unpublished M.A. thesis, School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology).
74. Brown, supra note 60, at 211.
75. Id. In our study, it is plausible that the requirement of unanimity pushed people
further in the direction of the dominant view, an idea that might be fortified with the
thought that those with outlier positions (in favor of extreme awards) would be especially
likely to hold out against a compromise view, thus producing pressure toward the
extremes. We are unaware, however, of any studies of choice shifts that show a difference
between the outcomes produced by a unanimity rule and the outcomes produced by
majority rule. Note also that numerous studies show that group polarization occurs
regardless of the decision rule and hence it is extremely unlikely that the unanimity rule
accounted for our results here: "The shift effect is about equally robust regardless of
whether a group decision is required." Myers & Lamm, supra note 3, at 611. Of course we
cannot exclude the possibility that the results would be somewhat different without a
unanimity rule; this is in fact a good area for subsequent empirical study, especially in light
of continuing questions about the consequences of requirements of jury unanimity.
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texts, involving, for example, questions about economic aid, political
leaders, race, 76 feminism, 77 and judgments of guilt or innocence. 78
We do not know if our jurors were susceptible to a group polariza-
tion, because members were not polled individually afterwards. But
group polarization usually occurs where choice shifts are found, and
hence there is reason to suspect that this happened here as well. 79 What
is most noteworthy is the finding of a choice shift for punishment ratings,
and the related finding of much larger severity shifts for high dollar
awards than for low dollar awards.
3. Two Mechanisms, and Severity Shifts Again. - There have been two
main explanations for group polarization and choice shifts, both of which
have been extensively investigated.8 0 Massive support has been found on
behalf of both explanations.8 '
The first explanation involves social comparison.8 2 On this view, peo-
ple want to be perceived favorably by other group members (and also to
perceive themselves favorably), and once they hear what others believe,
they adjust their positions in the direction of the dominant position.
They may want to signal, for example, that they are not cowardly or cau-
tious, and hence they will frame their position so that they do not appear
such in comparison to other group members.83 The dynamic behind the
social comparison explanation is that most people may want to take a
position of a certain socially preferred sort, and no one can know what
such a position would be until the positions of others are revealed.8 4
Thus individuals move their judgments in order to preserve their image
to others and their image to themselves. This dynamic helps explain a
shift toward caution (the "cautious shift") as well as toward risk-taking
(the "risky shift")85
76. See Brown, supra note 60, at 224.
77. See Myers, supra note 67, at 707-12.
78. See David G. Myers & Martin F. Kaplan, Group-Induced Polarization in Simulated
Juries, 2 Personality & Soc. Psychol. Bull. 63 (1976).
79. See Brown, supra note 60, at 226.
80. Brown, supra note 60, at 212-17, and Isenberg, supra note 3, review this literature.
81. Note that conformity does not explain group polarization and choice shifts. See
Brown, supra note 60, at 207-08 (rejecting conformity explanation on the basis that "the
risky shift is not convergence to the mean of initial positions, but, rather, to points on one
side of the mean, the riskier side").
82. There is an obvious connection between the social comparison explanation and
recent work in economics on reputational influences on behavior. See, e.g., Timur Kuran,
Private Truths, Public Lies (1996).
83. On signaling generally, see Eric Posner, Law and Social Norms (forthcomingJune
2000) (manuscript at 18-27, on file with the Columbia Law Review).
84. "Once the real location of the mean was known, should it not be the case,
granting that everyone wanted to see himself as reasonably audacious, that those who were
really below the mean would be motivated to adopt riskier positions and so change the
mean and produce the risky shift?" Brown, supra note 60, at 214.
85. Investigations of social influence have emphasized both one-upmanship and the
removal of pluralistic ignorance, that is, ignorance of what other people think (or are
1166 [Vol. 100:1139
HeinOnline  -- 100 Colum. L. Rev. 1166 2000
DELIBERATING ABOUT DOLLARS
The second explanation emphasizes the role of persuasive argu-
ments.86 The key point here is that an individual's choice or position on
an issue is a function of the number and persuasiveness of arguments
presented. Because a group that is inclined in a certain direction will
have a disproportionate number of arguments supporting that direction,
the result of discussion will be to move individuals further in the direc-
tion of their initial inclinations. Thus it is suggested that "[t]he important
thing that happens in discussion is that individual arguments are ex-
pressed and become fully shared."87 Once the set of individual argu-
ments is exposed to all individual members, there will be a movement
toward a more extreme point in the direction of initial inclinations, sim-
ply because arguments in that direction have been pressed and repeated
more frequently than opposing arguments.88
These two mechanisms help account for severity shifts as well; they
help explain rhetorical asymmetry. As our University of Chicago study
suggests, arguments for higher awards are more persuasive, other things
being equal, than arguments for lower awards. This is exactly what is
meant by rhetorical asymmetry, in the sense that certain arguments (for
"sending a stronger signal") are, we hypothesize, more convincing than
others (for "ensuring against overdeterrence"). In addition, social influ-
ences, given existing norms, are likely to push people toward higher
awards, simply because a concern for reputation, and for self-conception,
generally argues in favor of supporting higher awards in the face of con-
flict. People who argue for higher awards seem to want to give appropri-
ate punishment to wrongdoing (a good thing to seem to want), whereas
those who argue for lower awards seem, other things being equal, to be
lenient toward wrongdoing by corporations, or solicitous to them (not a
good thing to seem to be). We emphasize that these are simply descrip-
tive points, and that social norms could be otherwise, as they apparently
are in the context of criminal conviction, where leniency shifts have been
observed.8 9
IV. IMPLICATIONS AND REFORMS
To know whether the dollar awards of deliberating juries are better
than the dollar awards of statistical juries, it seems necessary to have a
theory of appropriate punitive damage awards, and it is not our purpose
willing to say they think). Note that it is implicit in these findings that people seem to want
not to conform, but to be different from others in a desirable way.
86. There is an obvious connection between the persuasive arguments explanation
and recent work in economics on informational influences on behavior, and in particular,
recent work on informational cascades. See, e.g., David Hirchleifer, The Blind Leading
the Blind, in The New Economics of Human Behavior 188, 193-207 (Mariano Tommasi &
Kathryn lerulli eds., 1995).
87. Brown, supra note 60, at 219. See Sunstein, supra note 60, for a general
discussion.
88. See Brown, supra note 60, at 219.
89. See supra note 2.
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here to set out such a theory. In its absence, the simplest conclusion
from our study is that to the extent that there is a concern about unpre-
dictable damage awards, deliberation is not likely to alleviate that con-
cern, and indeed is likely to aggravate it, as demonstrated by our discus-
sion in Part 11.90
This unpredictability would probably be lower with larger juries (say
of size twelve). But while this increase would almost certainly reduce the
problem somewhat-because predictability generally increases with
group size 9 1-there is little reason to hope that it would make a qualita-
tive difference. In our current study, deliberating juries of six performed
no more predictably than statistical juries of the same size when using the
punishment scale, and were less predictable when using the dollar scale.
The statistical juries in our previous study (which were the primary basis
for our conclusions about unpredictable awards) contained twelve jurors.
Thus, if the relationship between deliberating and statistical juries we
found here holds, it is likely that deliberating juries of twelve would show
less predictability for dollar awards than our statistical juries of twelve;
and those juries showed an extremely high degree of unpredictability.
Unpredictability is a serious problem for jury verdicts, partly because
it ensures that the similarly situated will often not be treated similarly
(and thus produces unfairness for plaintiffs and defendants alike), partly
because it may produce overdeterrence in risk-averse defendants (if some
of the awards are sufficiently high), and partly because of the sheer cost
involved in litigation-related expenses. Of course, predictable awards
might be nothing to celebrate if they are too high or too low. But unpre-
dictability is in itself a cause for serious concern. How do our findings
here bear on possible reforms?
With respect to damage awards, compensatory as well as punitive,
many proposals have been motivated by a desire to decrease unpredict-
ability. This goal has, for example, played a role in proposals for damage
caps, for simple multipliers (relating punitive awards to compensatory
awards), and for informing the jury of average awards or of intervals.92 It
has also played a role in constitutional limitations. 93 But many of these
proposals would do nothing about the problem of scaling without a
modulus; damage caps, for example, would reduce unduly high awards,
but would not inform the jury of the meaning of various possible awards.
90. Note also that because our study stipulated compensatory damages, and held
them fixed across cases, we may well have understated true variance in punitive awards,
because according to previous research, real juries anchor on their own compensatory
award, rather than on some constant value. See Eisenberg et al., supra note 10, at 637-39,
647; Karpoff & Lott, supra note 28, at 543.
91. See Saks, Tort Litigation System, supra note 43, at 1269, 1271-74.
92. See Saks et al., supra note 40, at 246 (discussing alternative approaches and their
effects).
93. See BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 585-86 (1996) (BreyerJ.,
concurring) (suggesting that punitive damages award is "grossly excessive" and beyond the
"constitutional limit").
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In fact there is evidence that caps can act as "anchors," drawing jurors to
them, and hence that caps can actually increase unpredictability. 94 For
these reasons damage caps are unlikely to resolve the fundamental
problem.
An understanding of that problem motivated our earlier discussion
of the possibility of eliciting from the jury not dollar awards, but norma-
tive judgments on a rating scale.95 These judgments might be converted
into a dollar award through some kind of calibration function, based on
experts ("technocratic populism") or on population-wide data relating
normative judgments to dollar awards ("predictable populism").96
Before our study here, it would be possible to question whether it is prac-
tical to ask a deliberating jury to make a moral judgment on a rating
scale, hardly an ordinary practice in daily life, and indeed a task that
might seem even odder than the somewhat more familiar one of punish-
ing wrongdoers through dollar awards.
The findings here do not lead directly to any particular reform pro-
posal, but they add several points to the existing literature. First, they
demonstrate that juries can use a punishment rating scale quite reliably.
Juries are able to answer the normative question directly, and they are
also able to use a rating scale far more reliably than the familiar dollar
scale. And if deliberating juries are thought to have advantages over
other, less populist institutions-as many people clearly believe 97 -then
there is reason to consider a reform proposal that would involve directly
eliciting the jury's moral judgment. As noted, this judgment might be
converted into a dollar award by some kind of calibration formula, de-
fined by expert judgments about what different dollar awards would
mean or do to particular defendants, or instead by population-wide data
relating normative judgments to dollar awards. Either route could greatly
diminish unpredictability. 98
The data here, along with previous data, show that a calibration
formula is also feasible to develop and use. 99 In such a reform, juries
might be asked to perform two simple tasks: decide whether punitive
damages should be awarded at all, and produce a "punishment rating" on
a scale that has verbal descriptions to accompany the numbers. It is easy
94. See Jennifer K. Robbenolt & Christina A. Studebaker, Anchoring in the
Courtroom: The Effects of Caps on Punitive Damages, 23 Law & Hum. Behav. 353, 367
(1999) ("[W]hen the cap was high, the size and variability of the punitive damage awards
were higher than awards in a control condition in which the cap was absent."). But see
Linda Babcock & Greg Pogarsky, Damage Caps and Settlement: A Behavioral Approach,
28J. Legal Stud. 341, 368 (1999) (finding "strong evidence that a cap reduces uncertainty
about the trial outcome").
95. See Sunstein, Kahneman, & Schkade, supra note 4, at 2112-21.
96. See id.
97. See, e.g., Galanter & Luban, supra note 19, at 1439 (arguing that "a jury is
especially suited to send the community's 'message' through the medium of damages").
98. See Sunstein, Kahneman, & Schkade, supra note 4, at 2112-20.
99. See id. at 2112-18.
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to imagine a possible jury instruction that would set forth these tasks. We
have shown that this approach is entirely feasible, and also that it would
increase predictability.100
An additional point stems from the finding that deliberating juries
do not reduce but actually increase erratic awards. We have seen as well
that deliberation can produce juries in which group discussion yields
awards much higher than those of even the highest of predeliberation
judgments. Without saying whether the resulting judgments are good or
bad, our findings fortify the suggestion that difficulties with the dollar
scale make it hazardous to continue to rely on the current system, in
which juries must map their moral judgments onto that scale without be-
ing given any guidance about the meaning of the various "points" on the
scale. 101
The most radical reform would be to dispense with the jury entirely
and to move toward judicial judgments or even to develop a kind of pen-
alty schedule, based on the judgments of some combination of represen-
tative and expert institutions. 10 2 We cannot evaluate these alternatives
here. Of course the radical reform might be rejected if the relevant insti-
tutions would be unreliable, perhaps because bureaucracies might be vul-
nerable to the influence of politically powerful private groups. The ques-
tion is one of comparative institutional competence. What we have
added here is that the process of deliberation will increase awards gener-
ally and high awards dramatically, a result that cannot be comforting in
light of the resulting unpredictability.
100. To be sure, eliciting moral judgments rather than dollar awards would not
answer all of the relevant questions, because choice shifts produce not only higher and
lower dollar awards, but also higher and lower moral judgments.
101. Cf. Lane v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 60, 72 (2000) (Brown, J.,
concurring in the result) (citation omitted):
U[lury determinations of punitive damages are likely to contain an element of
arbitrariness as long as the awards remain uncalibrated. To assure basic fairness,
courts must consider ways of calibrating punitive damage awards. We must ask
what anchoring variable will make an award of punitive damages an appropriate
measure of punishment rather than a test of a jury's ability to imagine big
numbers.
102. The idea has received considerable attention in the analogous area of contingent
valuation. See Murray B. Rutherford et al., Assessing Environmental Losses: Judgments of
Importance and Damage Schedules, 22 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 51, 51-56 (1998); Richard B.
Stewart, Liability for Natural Resource Injury: Beyond Tort, in Analyzing Superfund 219,
241-44 (Richard L. Revesz & Richard B. Stewart eds., 1995). In the area of compensatory
damages, see the plea for damages schedules in Bovbjerg et al., supra note 25, at 922, 937.
In the punitive damage context, see Sunstein, Kahneman, & Schkade, supra note 4, at
2121-25; Viscusi, supra note 18, at 589-90. For problems with the current damages regime
generally, see Atiyah, supra note 27, at 66-71.
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V. BRIEF GENERAL NOTES ON DELIBERATION
The topic of deliberation has attracted a great deal of recent interest
in both political and legal theory.10 s Much of the relevant work depends
on claims about the consequences of deliberation. But for the most part,
the discussion in law and political theory has not been empirically in-
formed. 10 4 Our study here provides a remarkable set of data about the
effects of deliberation with respect to both "pure" moral judgments (as
measured by punishment ratings) and dollar awards.105 An obvious ques-
tion is whether our analysis of the data suggests that deliberation has
moved people in better or worse directions. We offer some brief
notations.
It might seem tempting to say that with respect to both punitive in-
tent and damage awards, there is no basis for choosing between the re-
sults of jury deliberation and the results that would be produced by tak-
ing the median of nondeliberating six-person groups. Consider just one
case, in which the median individual predeliberation punishment rating
was 5.5 and the median dollar award $250,000; after deliberation, the jury
rating was 7.0 and the dollar award $3 million. Which is better? Without
a substantive theory about appropriate punishment ratings or dollar
awards, it might seem impossible to say. 10 6
If social influence and persuasive arguments are at work, there is a
tendency to move to a more extreme point in the direction of the group's
initial inclination; but do these mechanisms produce improvements? It
seems hard to know without evaluating the initial positions that produce
social influence, and without knowing whether the arguments found to
be persuasive are actually right. The finding of severity shifts, apparently
rooted in rhetorical asymmetry, also raises troubling questions. The argu-
ment that "a stronger signal needs to be given to other wrongdoers," or
that "we need to get the attention of this defendant," seems to be far
more powerful than the argument, "wait, there is a threat of overdeter-
103. See, e.g., Deliberative Democracy (Jon Elster ed., 1998) (collecting theories of
democracy revolving around "the transformation rather than simply the aggregation of
preferences"); Gutmann & Thompson, supra note 17 (developing "a conception of
democracy that secures a central place for moral discussion in political life").
104. An exception isJames Fishkin's set of studies of the "deliberative opinion poll."
See James S. Fishkin, The Voice of the People 161-76 (1998).
105. Note, however, that our study did not and could not guarantee what many
theorists of deliberative democracy take to be the preconditions of well-functioning
deliberation: an absence of strategic behavior, a willingness to listen, a norm of
reciprocity, and equality among members. Undoubtedly some of those in the groups we
studied behaved strategically and some were not willing to listen; some were undoubtedly
more equal than others. Ours is a test of real-world deliberation, not ideal deliberation.
An examination of the tapes gives an overall impression, however, that the participants
generally listened well and obeyed a principle of equality.
106. A more extended treatment of the normative issues raised by choice shifts and
group polarization can be found in Sunstein, Kahneman, & Schkade, supra note 4, at
2075-82.
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rence," or, "a punitive damage award will give the plaintiff a windfall."
Here too it is not clear whether the severity shifts lead to better
judgments.
It is always possible that the rhetorical asymmetry is counteracting
some other kind of asymmetry, or a bias in the system. If, for example,
jurors have a systematic bias against personal injury actions, a pro-plaintiff
rhetorical asymmetry, with respect to dollar awards, might supply a cor-
rective. What is disturbing about the rhetorical asymmetry that we have
described is not necessarily that it produces worse awards, but its mechan-
ical, case-independent quality. If the result of the rhetorical asymmetry is
to produce better awards, it would not be a shock-stranger things have
happened-but it would be a lucky coincidence.
To be sure, there may be procedural reasons to have some confi-
dence in the outcomes of a deliberative process. By hypothesis, more
time is spent on the problem, and more time might well help, at least in
general-judgments reached after deliberation will be more informed,
simply because more arguments will be introduced; deliberation tends to
increase consensus; and deliberation will, other things being equal, pro-
duce movement in the direction favored by more confident group mem-
bers, and more confident people are likely (though hardly certain) to
have some reason for their confidence. On procedural grounds, these
points give some reason to think that with respect to punishment ratings,
the outcomes of deliberation are likely to be better than the outcomes
that would be produced by identifying the median or mean judgment of
individuals. But because of the arbitrariness introduced by the selection
of a modulus, we have no such confidence for dollar verdicts. There is
little reason to believe that the dollar awards of actual juries are better
than the dollar awards of statistical juries. If all existing punitive damage
awards were doubled, or subject to a sliding scale of increase, so that
small awards would go up a little, and large awards would go up a lot,
would the system of civil penalties be better? We cannot insist on a nega-
tive answer, but it is far from obvious how one would defend an affirma-
tive answer.
CONCLUSION
We have found that as compared with the median of individual judg-
ments, deliberation makes low punishment judgments decrease and high
punishment judgments increase. It also makes-and this is our most im-
portant finding-dollar awards generally increase, while making high
dollar awards substantially increase, in a general severity shift. We have
also found, somewhat to our surprise, that deliberating juries produce
more unpredictability than would be found by taking the median of ju-
rors' predeliberation judgments.
These findings have implications for damage awards in general and
also for understanding social deliberation. From the normative point of
view, it is hard to know whether deliberative verdicts are better than the
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median of predeliberative individual judgments. But five points seem
clear. First, moral judgments about personal injury cases are very widely
shared over diverse communities and demographic categories. Second,
those shared moral judgments do not produce predictable dollar awards.
Third, choice shifts occur in the context of punishment ratings; hence
group judgments go to more extreme points in the direction of the incli-
nation originally indicated by the median of predeliberation judgments.
Fourth, dollar awards reflect a systematic severity shift, apparently a result
of a rhetorical asymmetry in which arguments for higher awards have a
general advantage over arguments for lower awards. Fifth, the problem
of unpredictable and erratic dollar verdicts is increased, not alleviated, by
the fact that juries are deliberative bodies.
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APPENDIX A: GLOvER v. GENERAL ASSISTANCE
Joan Glover, a five-year-old child, ingested a large amount of a non-
prescription allergy medicine called Allerfree, and required a three-week
hospital stay. The Allerfree bottle used a faulty childproof safety cap.
The Glovers sued the manufacturer of Allerfree, the General Assistance
company. The trial jury ordered General Assistance to pay the Glovers
$200,000 in compensatory damages.
Facts of the Case Established at Trial. - Joan's parents testified that
after her birth they had "childproofed" their house and ensured that all
of their medications had childproof safety caps. The Allerfree bottle car-
ries a label reading "Childproof Cap." Joan found the pills in a kitchen
drawer and ingested most of the bottle. The overdose permanently weak-
ened her respiratory system, which will make her more susceptible to
breathing-related diseases such as asthma and emphysema for the rest of
her life.
General Assistance is a large company (with profits of $100-200 mil-
lion per year) that manufactures a variety of non-prescription medicines.
The company has sold tens of thousands of bottles of medicines with
childproof safety caps that were generally effective, but had a failure rate
much higher than any others in the industry. Internal company docu-
ments showed that General Assistance had chosen to ignore federal regu-
lations requiring more effective safety caps. An internal memo presented
at trial says that "this stupid, unnecessary federal regulation is a waste of
our money"; it acknowledges the risk that Allerfree might be punished
for violating the regulation but says "the punishments are extremely mild;
basically we'd be asked to improve the safety caps in the future." An offi-
cial at the Food and Drug Administration had previously warned a Gen-
eral Assistance executive that the company was "on shaky ground on this
one."
Closing Argument by Glovers' Attorney. - The attorney for the Glovers
argued that General Assistance's disregard for children's safety and for
the law was abhorrent and represented exactly the kind of reckless corpo-
rate greed deserving of a high award of punitive damages. He concluded
that General Assistance's shocking profit-mongering should be punished
so that the company would not feel itself at liberty to put children at risk
in the future.
Closing Argument by General Assistance's Attorney. - The attorney for
General Assistance emphasized that while the cap had a high failure rate
relative to others on the market, it had nonetheless been conceded at
trial that the cap was effective in most cases. She argued that, given that
the FDA official had only communicated with General Assistance verbally,
and had not required the company to take any action, it was not at all
clear that the cap was actually in violation of the regulation at all.
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APPENDIX B: RHETORICAL ASYMMETRY QUESTIONNAIRE
A Jury's Decision
Imagine that a jury in a civil trial is deliberating about a personal
injury case in which the defendant is a large corporation (with annual
profits of approximately $200 million). The jury has already (a) unani-
mously ordered the defendant to pay an amount of compensatory dam-
ages that fully compensates the plaintiff, and (b) unanimously concluded
that while the underlying conduct was not truly horrendous, it was suffi-
ciently reckless to justify an award of punitive damages as well (in addi-
tion to compensatory damages).
The jurors then decided to think individually about the proper
amount of punitive damages, prior to deliberating as a group.
They have now made their individual determinations, and group de-
liberation has begun.
Please do not turn to the next page until requested to do so.
Deliberating over an Amount of Punitive Damages
Juror A states an amount of punitive damages. Juror B states an
amount that is much higher, three times A's amount. (You are not ex-
pected to know the exact amounts stated by A and B.)
What arguments would you expect to hear from Juror B, to support
an award that is higher than Juror A's proposal?
On the lines below, please write down a list of the arguments that
you might expect to hear from Juror B in support of a higher award.
Write as many distinct arguments as you can, briefly summarizing each
idea in a short phrase or sentence. Please write only one distinct idea per
line.
Which is Harder to Defend?
In general, which position would you expect to be harder for ajuror
to argue for in a deliberation? (please circle the letter of your answer)
a) it is harder to argue that damages should be higher
b) it is harder to argue that damages should be lower
c) the positions are equally hard to argue for
Very briefly, please write down the reason for your answer in the
space below.
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